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Why Should State Government Invest in College Education? 
An Equilibrium Approach for the US in 2000
*
 
This paper is a preliminary look at the benefits to states in the US of subsidizing college 
education. The benefits studies are the external benefits of college education on the earnings 
of both college graduates and those who have not graduated from college. In completing a 
college education individuals earn more. In addition, if there are positive external benefits 
others will also earn more because the average level of college graduates in the state has 
risen. This study confirms the existence of these positive externalities for the US in 2000 in 
estimates using the Current Population Survey. Furthermore, these external benefits are 
large enough that if confirmed in more complete studies would suggest that states invest too 
little in college education. 
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  College education is highly subsidized by state government in the US.  There are 
numerous justifications for this subsidization of which three will be mentioned here.  
First, subsidization increases the access to college education and hence increases the 
possibility for upward economic mobility.  Higher economic mobility could be valued in 
part as a social goal for its own sake and partly because it leads to greater effort and more 
innovative behavior.  Second, universities might directly create consumption and 
production externalities to firms or people located near the university.  Hence, local 
communities might lobby for more state support.  Third, a college education might 
indirectly create production externalities due to a higher average level of education of the 
labor force.  This third possibility has been central to models of economic growth.  In this 
paper we will consider evidence for this third possible source of externalities.  A model 
of these statewide externalities based on the growth model developed by Lucas (1988) 
will be developed and tested.  In the first section, a model of externalities to college 
education will be developed in which migration is introduced into the model.  The second 
section will discuss the empirical model and the third section will discuss the estimation 
and the results.  Finally, some brief conclusions will be made.    
  
Externalities to Education and Wage Rates 
  The possible existence of external benefits to education has long been thought to 
exist.  The standard economic justification for public funding of education depends upon 
the argument that there are external benefits to education (Schultz, 1988).  The existence 
  1of external benefits implies that without public support, society would under invest in 
education.  External benefits also imply that it would be unfair for individuals to pay for 
their entire education because they would be paying for benefits they do not receive.  
Confirming the existence and measuring the magnitude of these external benefits is 
essential if we are to provide the optimal subsidy for economic efficiency.   
  For the most part the literature on college education has focused on private 
returns.  Attaining a college degree is seen to be an investment in human capital.  The 
cost of this investment is foregone earnings from delaying entry into the labor market 
plus net tuition and other direct costs of attending college.  The return is the present value 
of higher wage rates that college graduates earn.  Following Mincer (1974) there have 
been various estimates of the wage premium from a college degree that find this premium 
to be substantial, particularly in the US.   
  Much of the literature on the external benefits of education has focused on 
education in general.  Early examples of this literature are Marshall (1890), Weisbrod 
(1962), and Friedman (1962).  Marshall emphasized the informal sharing of skills among 
workers.  Weisbrod emphasized a number of economic and non-economic externalities 
including the creation of a better learning environment for one’s own children and in 
one’s community.  Friedman mentioned the impact of a better educated electorate in 
making decisions leading to better public choices affecting the economy.   
  Lucas (1988) introduced these externalities to education into a growth model.  He argued 
that these externalities are essential if we are to explain international differences in income.  
Lucas considers a Cobb-Douglas production function  
(1) 
1 QA K L
α α − = , 
  2where L = λ(E)N, where λ(E) is worker productivity, E is education, N is the size of the labor 
force, K is total capital, Q is total output and A represents technology and other influences on 
total factor productivity.  Externalities to education are introduced by making A = A(E), i.e., the 
productivity of all factors are a positive function of education.  Lucas considers several examples 
to make his argument.  He takes an example where there is a substantial difference in income 
between a rich and a poor countries.  This difference might be the result of differences in factor 
proportions, technology, the internal returns to education and the external returns to education.  
After considering the realism of these implied factor returns, Lucas concludes that any reasonable 
explanation of factor returns must rest on the existence of external benefits to education.   
  One way of testing the Lucas hypothesis is to assume that education will impact wage 
rates through two channels.  First, education increases the productivity of workers directly by 
increasing λ(E).  Hence, it will increase that person’s productivity and consequently that person’s 
earnings.  Second, since Lucas argues that A also depends on the average level of education.  
Workers with more education may, through example or other spill over effects, increase the 
productivity of other workers.  This externality makes both capital and labor more productive.  
An externality is an uncompensated impact of one person’s action on the well-being of someone 
else.  The externality to education means that an increase in a person’s education will have two 
impacts.  First, it will increase that person’s productivity which will be reflected in that person’s 
wage rate.  Second, it will also increase average level of skill/education and, hence, will increase 
the productivity of others, which will be reflected in the average wage rate of others.  Hence, the 
returns to capital, labor and education will be higher in regions with higher average education 
than would be expected in the standard model.    
  Education affects wage rates by increasing the marginal product of labor (MPL).  MPL 
can be found by differentiating equation (1) with respect to N yielding 
(2)  (1 )( / ) MPL Q N α =− .   
  3On the assumption that workers are paid their marginal product, a wage equation can be estimated 
by substituting the wage rate for the marginal product of labor.  Since Lucas was concerned with 
an aggregate production function and explaining national differences in factor returns, the 
externalities to education were assumed to be country wide.  However, many tests of the Lucas 
hypothesis are based on the notion that the external benefits were to be observed chiefly within an 
industry.  Winter-Ebmer (1992) and Sakellariou and Maysami (2004) estimate average, 
industry-specific wage rates based upon the average level of education of workers by 
industry after accounting for differences in the compensation of workers in the industry.  
Moretti (2004b) examines spillovers from education within a plant.   
  A second group of tests assumes that the external benefits to education were 
spread across a community, which is defined as a metropolitan area.  In an early study 
Rauch (1993) looks at wage rates in US metropolitan areas.  Wages are estimated based 
on the average level of education within the region plus other regional characteristics and 
the characteristics of individuals within the region.  A difficulty with this approach is that 
an important variable in any wage equation for a region is capital per worker in the 
region.  Since the marginal product of labor is typically thought to be positively related to 
capital per worker, a key potential source of heterogeneity in a region is not included.  
Hence, capital per worker is assumed to be endogenous as would be the case in a hedonic 
migration model (see Roback, 1982 and 1988; and Shields, 1995).  Within this context, 
Rauch found support for the existence of city wide external benefits to education.   
  Hedonic models are based on an equilibrium assumption where, in equilibrium, 
the value of regional amenities is capitalized into lower wage rates and the rental price of 
housing.  For the aggregate production function of the form considered by Lucas, in 
equation (1), land does not enter the production function.  Hence, rental costs of land do 
  4not enter the firm’s decision to locate in a given region.  Only the wage rate and the 
productivity of workers enter this decision.   
  The model is illustrated in Figure 1.  Here, workers face a tradeoff between wage 
rates and housing rental costs.  The wage rate, in this example, is to be interpreted as the 
cost per unit of L and not N.  The supply of labor is given by S and is upward sloping 
because workers will tradeoff higher wages for higher rental costs.  Workers will move to 
a region if for a given housing cost, h, the wage rate, w, is above the supply curve.  
Hence, the supply of labor is upward sloping reflecting this trade off.   
   Figure  1. 
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  The demand for labor does not depend upon housing costs because in our model 
land is not a factor of production.  Consequently, the demand for labor, D, is horizontal.  
While this assumption comes directly from the production function used, it also makes 
discussion easier.  The results will be similar if D is allowed to be downward sloping.  
The demand for labor depends on two factors.  First, demand depends on the national 
wage rate.  Second, demand depends on productivity within the region.  In particular, D 
will shift upward if external benefits of education make workers and capital more 
productive.  Capital will move to the region until the wage rate rises to the new demand 
for labor. 
  5  Equilibrium exists in this model when supply equals demand.  In a hedonic 
migration model, regional economies are assumed to be in equilibrium.  Capital and labor 
are distributed between the regions in an optimal manner.  Labor receives the same wage 
rate in every region but pays higher housing costs in regions that have an abundance of 
consumption amenities.  The wage rate of individual workers will depend upon their 
education and, as we will see, the average level of education in the region.   
  An increase in the average level of education will increase the marginal product 
of all workers and, hence, will increase the wage rate.  This will shift the demand curve 
for labor upwards to D’ in Figure 1.   Consequently, the wage rate for each unit of L will 
rise along with housing prices in regions with an increase in the average level of 
education.  Note that, since capital adjusts to the wage rate, K/L will be the same in every 
region making it unnecessary to measure capital stock in order to estimate a regional 
wage equation.  We will see that this implication of the model can be tested if we have 
capital data.   
  Moretti (2004a) and also uses data for metropolitan areas.  Unlike Rauch, Moretti 
studies college graduates instead of education in general.  He extends Rauch’s model by 
using panel data methods and introducing instruments for the supply and the demand for 
college graduates.  He uses a demographic variable as an instrument for the supply of 
college graduates on the assumption that younger workers are the most likely to have 
graduated from college and whether the city has a land grant college as an instrument for 
the demand for college graduates on the assumption that land grant colleges are an 
exogenous source of technology that is biased toward highly educated workers.  Since 
  6capital data are not available by region, he can not, however, test the appropriateness of 
the hedonic model.   
  A few studies have used state-wide data.  State wide instruments were used by 
Acemoglu and Angrist (1999).  They use compulsory schooling laws.  While they are 
using state wide data they do not use physical capital, which becomes an unobserved 
determinant of wage rates.  Consequently, they too do not test the appropriateness of the 
model.  Shields and Shields (2006) also use state-wide.  For years of education, they find 
that capital per worker is significant but small.  However, it is unclear whether this result 
is enough to reject the hedonic model because of the small sample size they selected and 
because they use years of schooling and not college graduation as the education variables.   
Empirical Model 
  There are two key elements to the empirical model of the returns to college 
education, both external and internal, that will be developed.  The first element is that 
external returns should be clearly distinguished from internal returns.  The second 
element is that the impact of capital intensity on the wage rate be stated in a testable 
form.  Both can be accomplished by taking the natural logs of equation 2 and collecting 
terms.  The log of the wage rate can then be substituted for the log of the marginal 
product of labor.  The resulting equation, in stochastic form, is then  
(3)  01 2 ln( ) ln( ) ln( / ) SI S S S WE K N β ββ =+ +  
        34 ln( ) ln( ) Si Si Si EX β βε ++ + .      .   
The subscripts, S and ì represent states and individuals.  Hence, WSi is the wage rate of individual 
i living in state S, ES  is the proportion of the labor force with a college degree in state S, (KS/Ns) 
is capital per worker in state S, ESi is a dummy variable for whether individual i living in state S 
  7has graduated from college,  XSi is a vector of other characteristics of individuals such as 
experience and gender and  Si ε  is a stochastic error term.   
  The two regional variables, capital per capita and the proportion of the labor force with a 
college degree, are taken from a Solow growth model as augmented by Lucas.  Without 
migration, a higher capital-labor ratio will increase the marginal product of labor increasing the 
wage rate but will lower the profit rate.  Migration and capital mobility modify this picture.  
Recall that with migration and capital mobility an increase in the proportion of the labor force 
with college degrees might increase the wage rate and housing costs. The capital-labor ratio will 
adjust and, hence, will not be an exogenous variable.  If education creates external benefits, a 
higher average education will increase the marginal product of labor and capital.  Hence, higher 
average education will increase both the profit rate and the wage rate.  Furthermore, this increase 
in labor productivity would occur for all workers.  The individual variables will affect the 
productivity of individual workers and, hence, will also increase the wage rate.  Education 
increases individual human capital and, hence, the wage rate.  Consistent with Lucas, only 
education is assumed to generate external benefits.  To estimate the returns to college education, 
the education variable for the state will be the proportion of the working age population over 
twenty-five with a college diploma, while the individual education variable will be whether or not 
the person has completed college.  Once the internal and external returns to a college education 
are estimated, the results can be used and extended to address the questions raised along with 




  The data come from the two different types of sources.  The data on individuals 
comes from the Current Population Survey.  The survey was provided by the Minnesota 
  8Population Center (IPUMS).  To be in the sample the person must be currently employed, 
have earned income during the past year and be of working age.  Data for states come 
from Geographic Area Statistics: the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and from the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States.  Specific variables used are capital/(labor force), 
the proportion of the working age population 25 years and older, the age of the individual 
and various dummy variables represent whether the individual was white, foreign born or 
male.  The proportion of the labor force that has graduated from college was calculated 
for each state using the micro data provided by IPUMS.   
  As explained earlier, they variables of most interest are the two college education 
variable and the capital variable.  A dummy variable will be used for whether a person 
has graduated from college and the percentage of college graduates in the state will be 
used to capture the external effects of education.  It is expected that both variables will 
have a positive impact on wage earnings.  The other statewide variable, capital/(labor 
force) is expected to be positive but could be insignificant.  Its insignificance would lend 
support to the hedonic migration model.  The age of the worker is used to capture human 
capital that increases with experience.  The other variables are dummy variables 
indicating whether a worker is white, native born or male.  These dummy variables are all 
expected to have a positive impact on the wage rate, partly because of differences in 
acquired human capital but also partly because of economic discrimination.   
  Four different models are estimated.  First, a basic model is estimated based on 
the log-linear production function in equation 1.  The results are shown in columns A and 
B of Table 1.  Column A shows the estimates of the basic model discussed above.  Next, 
the basic model is extended by adding some dummy variables for occupation to the basic 
  9model as a check on the robustness of the results.  The results are shown in column B.  
Finally, for comparison and discussion, estimates for a linear version of the model are 
shown in columns A (the basic model) and B (the extended model).   
  The results in all four models show strong support for the existence of external 
returns to college education.  The coefficient,  % College, is significant at the 1% level.  
Subsidizing college education or attracting college graduates from elsewhere will 
substantially increase the average wage rate of all workers.  An estimate of the magnitude 
of this external effect can be most easily seen by looking at the linear models.  Here, an 
increase of one percentage point in the percent of the state’s work force that has 
graduated from college will increase the wage income of all workers by a little more than 
$500 for all workers in both linear models.
1  However, there is little evidence that a 
subsidy to capital formation will have any impact on average wage rates.   The 
coefficients in both models are small and insignificant.  The results provide support to 
hedonic migration models where capital flows to a region is the equilibrating factor.  
Capital seeks out lower wage rates bringing average wage rates up to the national average 
given education externalities and regional amenities.  This result lends support to 
previous studies that did not use capital data for the US.   
  Other variables of passing interest are the age, race, birth-place and gender 
variables.  The results for these variables are not surprising.  Wage rates tend to rise with 
age.  Older workers are more experienced and hence are more productive.  Native born 
workers earn more perhaps because of discrimination and perhaps because their human 
capital is better suited to their environment.   Women, as expected, earn less than men.  
                                                 
1 Another way of stating the size of this external benefit is that it increases all factor returns by about 
1.58%.   
  10There is mixed evidence that whites earn more.  Whites earn significantly more in the 
linear model but not in the log-linear model.
2   
  The results suggest a very large optimal subsidy to college education.  For 
simplicity of exposition, consider the linear model.  The estimated coefficient for % 
College represents the marginal external returns of a college graduate per worker.  These 
returns will occur for every year.  Furthermore, the externality will be realized by both 
employed persons and persons who decide to specialize in household production.  The 
value of the external benefits will be at least as large as the foregone earnings if a person 
is to withdraw from the labor market.  However, these implicit returns will be ignored in 
the present analysis and only explicit returns will be considered partly because state and 
federal taxes are not levied on implicit returns.    
  Since these returns occur through every year of a person’s working lifetime, we 
will need to discount these returns to find the net present value to the state of a college 
degree.  Assuming a 40 year work life and a real discount rate of 3%, the net present 
value of $462 is $15,400.  In addition, capital also becomes more productive.  The 
external benefit to capital will be assumed to be one-half the benefits to labor.  The 
reason for this assumption is that historically capital’s share of the output is about 1/3 
while labor’s share is about 2/3.
3  Consequently, the total net present value of this 
externality, to labor and capital, would be at least $23,100.  This value exceeds the 
average four year tuition subsidy in 2000.  Hence, the results indicate that the state 
funding of instructional costs is below the optimum.   
                                                 
2 However, if the native born variable is excluded (in results not shown here), race is 
significant in both models.   
 
3 See Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).   
  11  There are numerous reasons for caution in interpreting this sizeable externality.  
These reasons are of two types.  First, for numerous reasons the estimated coefficient for 
% College may be too large.  There may be omitted variables, collinear with % College, 
that may be important in explaining average labor productivity and, hence, wage rates.  
These omitted variables could represent other features of state policy.  Second, the 
interpretation of the estimated coefficient may be misleading.  In particular, a standard 
production function suggests nonlinearity.  The higher % College the lower its impact on 
wages.  In order to see which states would have the highest marginal return to investment 
in college education, refer to Table 2, which shows the percentage of college graduates 
variable by state for each of the census years.  There is considerable variability by state 
with West Virginia and Indiana having the lower percentage of college graduates.  An 
increase in college subsidies would therefore be expected to have a greater beneficial 
effect for states like West Virginia and Indiana than for states like Connecticut and 
Colorado with a more educated population.   
  A factor that may reduce the external benefits to states from investing in college 
education is that other states may free ride on their investment by attracting college 
graduates from other states.  The net amount of free riding would be the cumulative net 
loss in college graduates over the last forty years.  Merely establishing that a high 
proportion of a state’s work force that has graduated from college comes from migrants 
from other states is not sufficient to establish sizeable free riding.  Free riding, no matter 
how extensive, does not provide a basis for arguing that public financing of education 
should be smaller.  It merely provides a basis for arguing that the federal government 
should provide a commensurate share of this financing.   
  12Conclusions 
  There are sizeable externalities generated by college education for states.  The 
average value of these externalities is suboptimal for the US as a whole.  However, 
individual states might free ride by attracting college graduates from other states.  An 
avenue for future research is to judge the extent to which free riding occurs and, 
consequently, how much the federal government should pay in support of higher 
education.  Since it is also possible for the US, as a whole, to free ride on other countries 
investment in higher education, future research could also focus on immigration versus 
trade policy in terms of their impact on the external benefits from higher education.  Freer 
immigration might be preferable to freer trade, particularly the outsourcing of high 
skilled production, because it generated these positive externalities from education.   
  A more complete study would consider a panel beginning in 1994, when state 
capital variables became available and would introduce instruments into the model, 
which might be a supply or demand instrument.  A possible supply instrument is the 
proportion of young workers in the labor force.  Young workers are more likely to have a 
college degree than older workers and will increase the supply of college graduates.  A 
possible demand instrument is the number of top research industries in the state.  
Research industries may increase the relative productivity of college graduates versus 
other workers within a state and, consequently, increase the demand for college graduates 
and hence their wage rates.  




































































































































t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level.  
  14 
Table 2 
The percentage of the labor force with a college degree 
 
states year2000  year1990  year 1980 
Alabama 20.4  15.7  12
Alaska 28.1  23.0  21.47
Arizona 24.6  20.3  17.67
Arkansas 18.4  13.3  10.72
California 27.5  23.4  19.74
Colorado 34.6  27.0  22.89
Connecticut 31.6  27.2  20.98
Delaware 24.0  21.4  17.19
District of Columbia  38.3  33.3  28.62
Florida 22.8  18.3  14.96
Georgia 23.1  19.3  14.52
Hawaii 26.3  22.9  19.76
Idaho 20.0  17.7  15.51
Illinois 27.1  21.0  15.93
Indiana 17.1  15.6  12.16
Iowa 25.5  16.9  14.28
Kansas 27.3  21.1  17.72
Kentucky 20.5  13.6  11.36
Louisiana 22.5  16.1  13.65
Maine 24.1  18.8  14.33
Maryland 32.3  26.5  20.88
Massachusetts  32.7 27.2 20.5
Michigan 23.0  17.4  14.39
Minnesota 31.2  21.8  17.82
Mississippi  18.7 14.7 12.4
Missouri 26.2  17.8  13.81
Montana 23.8  19.8  16.68
Nebraska 24.6  18.9  14.06
Nevada 19.3  15.3  14.86
New Hampshire  30.1  24.4  17.65
New Jersey  30.1  24.9  18.19
New  Mexico  23.6 20.4 17.8
New York  28.7  23.1  17.67
North Carolina  23.2  17.4  13.19
North Dakota  22.6  18.1  10.91
Ohio 24.6  17.0  13.88
Oklahoma 22.5  17.8  15.33
Oregon 27.2  20.6  18.18
Pennsylvania 24.3  17.9  13.73
Rhode Island  26.4  21.3  13.95
South Carolina  19.0  16.6  13.32
South Dakota  25.7  17.2  12.72
Tennessee 22.0  16.0  12.61
Texas 23.9  20.3  16.86
Utah 26.4  22.3  19.94
Vermont 28.8  24.3  19
Virginia 31.9  24.5  19.61
Washington 28.6  22.9  19.34
West  Virginia  15.3 12.3 10.5
Wisconsin 23.8  17.7  14.89
Wyoming 20.6  18.8  16.35
US  Average  25.2 20.0 16.2 
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